DEFINITIVE SENTENCE

IN THE CASE OF THE REV. MARVIN T. KNIGHTON



In the name of God. Amen.

This case is explicitly subject to the Pontifical Secret (*14. 25, Graviora Delicta, Normae Processuales); this applies to all information, processes and decisions associated with this case (Secreta continere, February 4, 1974 [AAS 66 1974, pages 89-92]).

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a. FACTI SPECIES:

The Rev. Marvin T. Knighton was ordained to the Roman Catholic priesthood for the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, Wisconsin on May 24, 1975. On February 25, 2002, Mr accused Father Knighton [bereinafter: reus] of sexually abusing him on a number of separate occasions. This information is found in the Sexual Abuse Intake Report taken by Dr. Barbara Reinke, PhD. [Tribunal Pile, pages 001 & 002].

A second allegation was introduced by Attorney Nick Kostich alleging that the reus sexually abused on or about June 25, 2002. A third accusation was made by on or about January 17, 2003. These allegations were brought to the attention of the then-Archbishop of Milwaukee, the Most Reverend Rembert G. Weakland, OSB.

Following the prescribed preliminary investigation, the Diocesan Review Board and the Archbishop found that none of the allegations involving those victims were either frivolous or false. It was determined that the allegations carried the semblance of truth and were credible, and, in accord with the norm of law, they were then referred to the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith (hercinafter: CDF) for direction as to the process to be used. The CDF directed that a penal judicial trial be conducted in the Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Milwaukee and granted a derogation from prescription.

Exercising his office as Promoter of Justice for the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, on February 4, 2005, the Reverend Philip D. Reifenberg, JCL, presented to the Judicial Vicar of the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, the Very Reverend Paul B. R. Hartmann JCL, a libellus charging the Reverend Marvin T. Knighton, a priest incardinated in the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, with offenses against the sixth commandment of the Decalogue involving the sexual abuse of three minors. All of the incidents are alleged to have occurred within the Archdiocese of Milwaukee. In response to the Bellus, a collegiate tribunal was constituted on March 21, 2005 by the Most Reverend Timothy Dolan, DD, Archbishop of Milwaukee, consisting of the

the Archdiocese of Chicago, as associate Judges. The Promoter of Justice is the Reverend Philip Reifenberg, JCL; (hereinafter: Promoter"). The duly-mandated Advocate of the reus is Mr. J. Michael Ritty, JCL, PhD, (hereinafter: "Advocate"). A penal trial against Father Knighton was then begun.

It should be noted that at the start of the case, the Advocate raised objections to the role that the of the Archdiocese of Milwaukee would play in the case because of his connection to the Archdiocesan officials and structures who are being presumed as those leveling the charges against the reus. During the discussion of the three judge panel it was noted — within the norms of Canon Law and the historic manner in which trials are to be handled— a penal trial would normally be staffed by members of the local clergy as judges within the local tribunal. Thus, the use of two outside judges out of the three on the collegiste tribunal is itself exceptional in the eyes of the law. This exception is a contemporary accommodation that is used to react to the unique circumstances of this time in history. Given

that there are two out of the three judges who do not have any objections raised against them by the Advocate, nor has the Promoter objected to the empancilled Tribunal, it is felt that equity and fairness could be protected and maintained. Thus, the objections of the Advocate to the role of this associate judge were set aside.

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In accord with Canon 1513, §1, the contestatio litis was conducted on July 1, 2005, and the doubt was formulated in the following fashion:

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I) Is the Reverend Marvin T. KNIGHTON guilty of offending against the sixth commandment of the Decalogue with Mr. who had not completed his sixteenth year of age until the time of offense?

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2) Is the Reverend Marvin T. KNIGHTON guilty of offending against the sixth commandment of the Decalogue with who had not completed his sixteenth year of age at the time of the offense?

 3) Is the Reverend Marvin T. KNIGHTON guilty of offending against the sixth commandment of the Decalogue with Mr. who had not completed his sixteenth year of age at the time of the offense?

Also, by the same decree the prases incorporated into the acta the Clergy Personnel File [hereinafter: Clergy File] and the Chancery File [hereinafter Chancery File] of the reus, and the transcript of the Civil Trial of the State of Wisconsin versus the Reverend Marvin T. Knighton [hereinafter: Civil Trial]. According to the norm of Canon 1516, by the same decree the prases directed that the reus, as well as those nominated as witness by the Advocate and the Promoter, be cited for their testimony.

II. IN IURE.

Mindful that this matter was similarly legislated by the 1917 Code of Canon Law in Canons 2358 and 2359, §2, the Court begins with the legislation concerning this delict from the 1983 Code of Canon Law for the Latin Church:

 Can.1395. §1. A cleric who fives in concubinage, other than the case mentioned in can. 1394, and a cleric who persists with scandal in another external sin against the sixth commandment of the Decalogue is to be punished by a suspension. If he persists in the delict after a warning, other penalties can gradually be added, including dismissal from the elerical state.

§2. A eleric who in another way has committed an offense against the sixth commandment of the Decalogue, if the delict was committed by force or threats or publicly or with a minor below the age of sixteen years, is to be punished with just penalties, not excluding dismissal from the clerical state if the case so warrants.

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The grave nature of this delict and of allegations of this delict is further indicated by the derogations granted by the Holy Father on April 25, 1994. In a rescript responding to a petition made by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops [hereinofter USCCB], the Supreme Legislator conformed the norm of Canon 1395, §2 to the norm of Canon 97, §1 so that for an initial period of five years, this delict would involve offenses against the Sixth commandment of the Decalogue with anyone below the age of eighteen years. In the same rescript he modified prescription so that a criminal action would not be extinguished until a longer period of time had passed. This particular legislation was made more explicit and extended to the universal Church by Sacramentorum Sanctitatis Tutela (Graviora Delicta) of April 30, 2001.

Article 4 of the Substantive Norms of this motu proprio legislates:

§1. Reservation to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith is also extended to a delict against the Sixth Commandment of the Decalogue committed by a cleric with a minor below the age of eighteen years.

 §2. One who has perpetrated the delict mention in §1 is to be punished according to the gravity of the offense, not excluding dismissal or deposition.

With regard to this delict, in response to a petition made by the USCCB, on December 8, 2002 the Apostolic See gave the recognitio for the Norms that upon promulgation became particular law for two years for the Church in the United States of America. Upon expiration of the time period, the Apostolic See gave the recognitio to the revised Norms; these were promulgated on May 5, 2006 and became particular law for 'the dioceses, eparchies, elerical religious institutes and societies of the apostolic life of the United States with respect to all priests and deacons in the ecclesiastical ministry of the Church in the United States...[note #1]'. In this matter, the particular law for the Church in the United States legislates:

For purposes of these Norms, sexual abuse shall include any offense by a cleric against the Sixth Commandment of the Decalogue with a minor as understood in CIC, canon 1395, §2 and CCEO 1453, §1 (Sacramentorum Sanctitatis Tutela, article 4, §1) [Preamble, final paragraph].

 When even a single act of sexual abuse of a minor by a priest or deacon is admitted or is established after an appropriate process in accordance with canon law, the offending priest or deacon will be removed permanently from ecclesiastical ministry, not excluding dismissal from the clerical state ... [Norm 8]

...If the case would otherwise be barred by prescription, because sexual abuse of a minor is a grave offense, the bishop/eparch may apply to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith for a derogation from the prescription, while indicating relevant grave reasons... [Norm 8A]

Mindful of the norm of law with regard to the passage of time as it applies to this delict (Canon 1362), in view of the recognitio given to the above-cited legislation, it is noted that a derogation from prescription may be given.

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In understanding what constitutes a juridic offence against the Sixth Commandment of the Decalogue, the opinions of Moral Theologians are to be considered. The focus of these manualists is sacramental confession, but they provide analyses of what constitutes the act, the gravity of the act and the significance of intentionality. This enables a clearer understanding of the nature and scope of the delict. This is necessary because allegations of this delict often involve more, or actions other, than just a completed act of sexual intercourse, either heterosexual or homosexual. There are a variety of possible physical contacts as well as a complex psychological dynamic which the delict can entail. As the law simply states the name of the delict, and there is little available dicasterial jurisprudence, these analyses assist the judges in assessing whether or not a delict has been committed, and if so the magnitude of the act.

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With regard to determining the possible sexual content and moral gravity of an act which involves solely touching or other physical contact, the Reverend Henry Davis SJ, comments:

Si vero protrahantur sine causa et concomitante delectatione vererea sunt gravia peccata (Moral and Pastoral Theology JLondon & New York: Sheed and Ward, 1959), vol. II, page 248).

If the act has been protracted and lacks a justification while providing sexual gratification, then it is gravely sinful, and concomitantly a crime. In describing the nature of imperfect, that is non-consummated, same-sex acts, the Rev. Edward Genicol, SJ writes:

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Imperfecto dicitur quando inter personus eiusdem sexus non datur coitus seu copula (applicatio corporum cum penetratione et effusione seminis) sed concubitus tantum, i.e. application corporum et unius saltem genitalium, sine penetratione sed cum voluptate complecta conaturaliter sequente, ut si fit inter duas feminas, vel etiam inter duos viros it tamen ut effusion seminis extra vas posterum peragatur (histitutiones Theologiae Moralis [Bruxellis: L'Édition Universelle S.A., 1939], vol. 1, page 319).

 With regard to physical contact, if it is because of 'tantum officii, aut moris patrii, aut annoris honesti vel benevolentiae augendue causu, it may not be a violation of the Sixth Commandment of the Decalogue (opagecit., page 331). However, if the act is motivated by sexual pleasure, then it is a violation of the Sixth Commandment of the Decalogue:

Hoc actus ponere intendendo delectationem veneream complectam vel incomplectam, semper grave peccatum est, ex intentione luxuria directe voluntaria... (opage cit., page 329).

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In Moral Theology if the intention which motivates an act is for venereal pleasure, it is grave matter; thus it would be the delict. For such gravity of matter, it is not necessary that there be complete sexual intercourse, either heterosexual or homosexual. Incomplete, that is imperfect, acts which are motivated by a desire for sexual or psychologically venereal pleasure are grave matter and consequently fit within the definitions of the delict. In determining the character and gravity of act, what is intended is of more significance than the completed emission of somen in some particular action.

With regard to physical centact, the Reverend Antonio M Arregui, SJ teaches:

Tungere ...sine justa causa morose et cuncommotione venera, mortale est ...ftangere] etiam supra vestem, generatim mortale est... (Summarium Theologiae Moralis ad Codicem luris Cunonici accommodatum [Bilbao: Editorial El Mensajero del Corazón de Jesús, 1952], #268).

Thus even contact over clothing may be grave matter and consequently a delict. This will be articulated clinically by the various peritti who are quoted below. In determining the responsibility for, and the gravity of, an act, the classic Moral Theology manual by the authors II. Noldin, SJ and A. Schmitt, SJ underscores the subjective significance of the person who is acting:

Delectatio igitur venerea (vel pollutio) in causa volita grave est peccatum, si ipsa causa ex se graviter in turpem commotionem influit (Summae Theologiae Moralis, vol 1 De Principiis, De Sexto Praecepio [Romae: Oeniponte, 1924], #13).

And more specifically with regard to personal responsibility:

Si fiunt ex prave et libidinoso affectu, licet ex se parum in libidinem influant ut aspectus mulieris, contrectatio manus etc., semper grave peccutum sunt propter intentionem gravite malam; ideo nihil referi, utrum actus ipsi magis an minus turpes sint... Si fiunt ex sola intentione delectationis sensualis leve peccutum sunt, nisi inducant proximum periculum commotonis carnalis et consentiendi in delectationem veneream, ut evenire potest, si cum aliquo affectu et mora exerceantur (opagecit., #52).

In discussing alternative sexual appetites, the authors comment:

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Peccala, quae ab iis committuntur, qui hac perversione laborant, sunt polhuiones per tactus provocatae et concubitus sodomítici. Si perversa inclinatio in pueros fértur, paederastia vocatur, ... (opagecit., 447).

With regard to actual physical contact, even over clothing, they write:

Tangere personam eiusdem sexus in partibus inhonestis sine iusta causa grave est, etsi mediate supra vestes tantum fiut, quia multum commovet... Tangere personam eiusdem sexus in partibus minus honestis exclusa prava intentione, vix erit percotum, saltem grave... (opago cit., 1855).

An external violation of the Sixth Commandment of the Decalogue can involve simply physical contact. Therefore, a complete act of sexual intercourse, either heterosexual or homosexual, is not required. If the intention of the contact is for sexual pleasure, then it is a violation of the commandment; if it involves a minor it is also a canonical delici. This is succinctly stated by a peritus in the law who describes in a negative fashion what constitutes the delicit:

Non è necessario che gli atti di hussuria siano consumati, ma bastano anche atti non consumati, quali toccamenti o baci libidinosi, contatti di organi sessuali, ecc. (Antonio Calabrese, Diritto Penale Canonico [Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrico Vaticana, 1996], page 354).

This juridic understanding of a violation of the Sixth Commandment of the Decalogue, based on Moral Theology, did not begin with the 1983 Code of Canon Law. Commentators on the 1917 Code of Canon Law commonly held that 'an offense against the sixth commandment' refers generically to 'crimes of lust' (Pio Ciprotti, De consummatione delictorum attento eorum elementum objectivo: Caput IV, Apollinaris 9 [1936], pages 404-414]. Bringing together both the insights of Moral Theology and the juridic norms, the Catechism of the Catholic Church states the following:

The tradition of the Church has understood the sixth commandment as encompassing the whole of human sexuality (n. 2336).

Along with the teaching of moral theologians, to understand this delict, and in accord with the norm of law (e.g., Canon 1574), the researched. Validated, and generally accepted insights of psychology and the mental health disciplines are quite relevant. This is important not just to provide an intellectual framework to comprehend the delict, but also to evaluate the facts, the testimony and all other evidence to determine if the clinical indicators of the delict are present. The opinions of periti are needed not just for the juridic theory but also for the evaluation of proofs.

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Consistent with the above-quoted canonical opinion, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry has defined sexual abuse of minors in the following manner:

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Sexual abuse of children refers to sexual behavior between a child and an adult or between two children whom one of them is significantly older or uses coercion. The perpetrator [offender] and the victim may be of the same sex or the opposite sex. The sexual behaviors include touching breasts, buttocks, and genitals, whether the victim is dressed or undressed, exhibitionism [indecent exposure], fellatin foral stimulation of the penis], cunnilingus [oral stimulation of the female vaginal area], and penetration of the vagina or amus with sexual organs or objects. Exposure to pornographic material is also sexually abusive to children ...(Practice Parameters for the Forensic Evaluation of Children and Adolescents who may have been physically or sexually abused, 1997)

The literature indicates that there is no definitive indicator of a sexually abused child, but there are symptoms that present frequently in young survivors; these include anxiety/numbing, hypersensitivity, depression, alcohol and/or drug use, problem sexual behaviors, and aggression. Another symptom is an attachment abnormality; the victim cannot give up the attachment to, and involvement with, the perpetrator [Ross Colin, The Trauma Model: A Solution to the Problem of Comorbidity in Psychiatry (Manilou Communications: 2000) page 286]. In defining sexual abuse of a minor, the American Academy of Pediatrics notes the significance of age symmetry in differentiating sexual abuse and sexual play; what may be sexual play for age-symmetrical

individuals is abuse for age-asymmetrical individuals:

The sexual [abuse] activities may include all forms of oral-genital, genital, or anal contact by or to the child, or nontouching abuses, such as exhibitionism, voyeurism, or using the child in the production of pornography. Sexual abuse includes a spectrum of activities ranging from rape to physically less intrasive sexual abuse. Sexual abuse can be differentiated from "sexual play" by determining whether there is a developmental asymmetry among the participants and by assessing the coercive nature of the behavior. Thus, when young children at the same developmental stage are looking at or touching each other's genitalia because of mutual interest, without coercion or intrusion of the body, this is considered normal (i.e., nonabusive) behavior. However, a 6-yearold who tries to coerce a 3-year-old to engage in anal intercourse is displaying abnormal behavior, and the health and abild protestive systems should be contacted although the incident may not be legally considered an assault. Children or adolescents who exhibit inappropriate sexual behavior may be reacting to their own victimization. (Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect, Guidelines for the Evaluation of Sexual Abuse of Children)

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Echoing the teachings of the moral theology manualists, an Australian National Child Protection Clearinghouse research paper spoke of sexual abuse of a minor as relating to any use for sexual gratification:

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Put simply, child sexual abuse is the use of a child for sexual gratification by an adult or significantly older child/adolescent (Tower 1989). It may involve activities ranging from exposing the child to sexually explicit materials or behaviors, taking visual images of the child for pornographic purposes, touching, foudling and/or masturbation of the child, having the child touch, fondle or masturbate the abuser, oral sex performed by the child, or on the child by the abuser, and anal or vaginal penetration of the child. Sexual abuse has been documented as occurring on children of all ages and both sexes, and is committed predominantly by men, who are commonly members of the child's family, family friends or other trusted adults in positions of authority... Finkelhor (1979) argued against the term sexual assault and sexual abuse because he felt they implied physical violence which, it was contended, was often not the case... Finkelhor favored the term sexual victimization in order to underscore that children become victims of sexual abuse as a result of their age, naivete and relationship with the abusive adult. (Issues in Child Abuse Prevention Number 5 Summer 1995, Update on Child Sexual Abuse, by Adam M. Tomison (Research Fellow)).

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Observing the above-quoted reference to 'trusted adults in positions of authority' and flowing from the juridic delineation of the delict, the Court is mindful of the issue of answerability. It is the presumption of the law that the actor (in this circumstance, a cleric) is responsible for his behavior, unless the opposite of this presumption of the law can be proved. This is the presumption in the doctrine and jurisprudence dealing with matrimonial consent (Canon 1101) and it is the presumption in penal trials as the following canon notes:

> Can.1321, §3: When an external violation has occurred, imputability is presumed unless it is otherwise apparent.

The Court then turns to the substantive material upon which a decision about the delicts that have been alleged will be made. Direction for this judicial munus is provided again both by doctrine and jurisprudence. The general norm is that proofs of any kind that seem useful for adjudicating the case can be brought forward (c.f., Canon 1527, §1). More specifically, a norm addresses the manner in which the Tribunal of judges uses the proofs:

> Can. 1608 §1. For the pronouncement of any sentence, the judge must have moral certified about the matter to be decided by the sentence.

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1 2	§2. The judge must derive this certifule from the acts and the proofs.
3 4 5 6	§3. The judge, however, must appraise the proofs according to the judge's own conscience, without prejudice to the prescripts of law concerning the efficacy of certain proofs.
7 8	§4. A judge who was not able to entire at this certifude is to
9	pronounce that the right of the petitioner is not established and is to
10	dismiss the respondent as absolved, unless it concerns a case which
11	has the favor of law, in which case the judge must pronounce for
12	that.
1.3	The norm of Canon 1572 is also of significance because so much of the acta is the
15	testimony of witnesses. That Canon legislates how such festimony is to be evaluated:
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17	Can. 1572: In evaluating testimony, the judge, after having
1.8	requested testimonial letters if necessary, is to consider the
19 20	following:
21	1° what the condition or regutation of the person is;
22	2° whether the testimony derives from personal knowledge,
23	especially from what has been seen or heard personally, or
24	whether from opinion, rumor, or hearsay;
2.5	3° whether the witness is reliable and firmly consistent or
26	inconsistent, uncertain, or vacillating;
27 28	4° whether the witness has co-witnesses to the testimony or is supported or not by other elements of proof.
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30	Of significance also is the norm of Canon 1579, §1 which directs the Court to consider
31	not just the conclusions but also the other findings of the case which a peritus might identify.
32	This norm, which is evident also in Rotal jurisprudence, pertains whether the peritus is appointed
33	by the Court or a professional whose work is incorporated into the acta from previous efforts
34 35	with the same party.
36	Given the antecedent iter processulis of these cases in the United States today, the norm
37	of Canon 1536, §2 must also be noted. Because in tempore difficile statements may have been
38	made, it is essential that the evidentiary weight assigned to such statements be guided by
39	canonical doctrine:
40	r' 1524.
41 42	Can. 1536:
42	§2. In cases which regard the public good, however, a judicial
44	confession and declarations of the parties which are not
45	confessions can have a probative force which the judge must
46	evaluate together with the other circumstances of the case; the

force of full proof cannot be attributed to them, however, unless other elements are present which thoroughly corroborate them.

In a further elaboration of the above-cited canonical norm, the jurisprudence teaches that the truth emerges not from one or other element but from the whole complexus of the case. In a decision dealing with a case of simulation, a Rotal Auditor has noted:

 Quod autem spectat pondus argumentorum, quibus nisus ludex requisitam moralem certitudinem sibi comparare valet, recolatur veritatem non esse ex uno alterove elemento eruendam, sed ex toto causae complexii (coram Rogers, 19/XII/64, II6, as found in S.R.R.Dec. 56 [1964], page 956).

The truth comes not from one or another element, but from all the elements taken together. Similarly in a decision dealing with simulation rendered by an earlier Rotal Auditor:

Quae etian veritas resultat aliquando ex multis indiciis et prohationibus, quae sumpta seorsim certitudinem vix ingeruni, at unita maxime iuvant (caram Felici, 17/V/52, #2, as found in SRRI) 44 [1952], page 448).

 This jurisprudence on the whole complexus, or constellation of facts if you will, of indices underscores the significance, in the evaluation of proofs, of patterns of behavior. Again, the decisions of the Rota dealing with simulation of consent, both total and partial, illustrate the judicial importance of such patterns of behavior. In a decision resolving a case on the grounds of simulation of consent contra bonum fidei, a noted Rotal Auditor wrote:

 Confessio itaque simulantis non necessario verbis facienda est: sufficit fiat factis, quae verbis sunt aliquando eloquentiora. dummodo tomen facta sint phuro, sint certa, sint univoca, id nompe in communi aestimatione damonstrent, noluisse partem contrahentem se vinculo matrimonii obstringere (corum Felici, 24/IV/56, #3, as found in SRRD 48 [1956], p 403).

As then Msgr. Pelici noted, if the behavior is present, it is not necessary that the proper words be used to respond to the question before the Court; the facts speak louder than the words.

For the finding of this Tribunal, because the presumption of the law is the innocence of the reus (2006 Essential Norms, Norm 6), the Reverend Judges must have moral certitude to overcome the presumption of the law and find for his guilt. The Code legislates this requirement in Canon 1608, as quoted above. With regard to moral certitude, it must be remembered that the dynamic of this canonical standard of proof differs from common law. In common law, not only is believability figured into the standard, but also the quantity of evidence; thus, the language is phrascal as 'the proponderance of evidence' and 'beyond a reasonable doubt'. In canonical doctrine, while the quantity of evidence is a consideration, the dynamic uses the quality of the evidence more significantly. In the former, quantity can affect the weight of the evidence. In the

latter, the search for truth moves toward an act of moral judgment about the quality of what has been brought forth. It is the exclusion of a reasonable doubt that does admit the absolute possibility of the contrary. This is significant in a case in which the evidence is the narrative of the parties, along with the background, circumstances and context that surrounds them. Moral certitude requires a judgment about the quality of what both parties have presented and the context of the situations, which are taken as a whole. As Pius XII stated in his address to the Roman Rota on October 1, 1942:

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Sometimes moral certainty is derived only from an aggregate of indications and proofs which, taken singly, do not provide the foundation for true certifude, but which, when taken together, no longer leave room for any reasonable doubt on the part of a man of sound judgment. This is in no sense a passage from probability to certainty through a simple cumulation of probabilities, which would amount to an illegitimate transit from one species to another essentially different one...; it is rather to recognize that the simultaneous presence of all these separate indications and proofs can have a sufficient basis only in the existence of a common origin or foundation from which they spring, that is, in objective truth and reality... Consequently, if in giving the reasons for his decision, the judge states that the proofs which have been adduced, considered separately, cannot be judge sufficient, but that, taken together and embraced in a survey of the whole situation, they provide the necessary elements for arriving at a safe definitive judgment, it must be acknowledged that such reasoning is in general sound and legitimate. (#2)

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And of added relevance is the further statement of the Holy Father of the relationship of procedure to the atteinment of this moral certifude:

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Hence you see why, in modern, even ecclesiastical, procedure, the first place is given, not to the principle of juridical formalism, but to the maxim of the free weighting of the evidence. (#4)

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With regard to the integrity of judicial procedure, the Reverend Judges are distinctly mindful of the right of defense. As the Code specifically legislates:

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Can. 1620 A sentence suffers from the defect of irremediable nullity if: ...

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7° the right of defense was denied to one or the other party; ...

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To understand what the right of defense correctly entails in a judicial process, the Reverend Judges look to the jurisprudence of the Apostolic Tribunals. In a decision of the Roman Roia, the present Dean writes:

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Quare substantiali iure defensionis is certo spoliatus habetus, qui neo actioni a parte adversa in indicium deductae contradicere valuit ob agendi rationem ipsius Tribunalis, nec probationes tempore instructionis collectas impugnare, nec propriam declarationem iudicialem facere, nec argumenta exhibere quoad factum circa quod iudichun versabatur... (coram Stankiewicz, 22/XI/84, #5, as found in Monitor Ecclesasticus 113 [1988], pages 320-327).

That is, a substantial denial of the right of defense takes place when the adversarial party is not able to offer a contradiction, or when he is not able to oppose the proofs which have been gathered, or when he is not able to present his own side of the story in court, or when he is not able to present arguments about the contested issue in court. This is further enunciated in a decree of the Apostolic Signatura:

Admitti nequit doctrina Tribunalis circa ius defensionis partis corwentae, quod non solum requirit ut conventa audiotur, verum etiom ut inre contradicendi reopse gaudeat (SA 19989/88 VT, art. C, n. 4).

Foundationally, the right of defense consists not just in being heard, but in having the opportunity to contradict the evidence. However, the jurisprudence also teaches that this is not merely a formalism. In this, the Rota echoes the teaching of Pius XII that was quoted above. In assessing the integrity of a judicial process, the Rota assesses whether or not the parties know the proofs and have an opportunity to respond to them. Commenting on the difference between observing all the solemnities and the essentials of the judicial process, in a marriage case the then-Dean Pompedda observes:

Concludendum quapropter est defuisse quidem iudicii sollemnitates sed essentialia processus (actricis petitionem, determinationem obiecti litis, citatione malterius partis, Vinculi Defensioris interventum, facultatem sese defendendi utriusque partis) tecta servata fuisse, atque ideo processus nullitatem nullomodo sustineri (coram l'ompedda, 17/V(/85, #16, as found in SRRD 77 [1985], page 291).

In understanding the right of defense, the Reverend Judges look to the opportunity to know and react to the proofs; they look to the essentials of the process. The creative innovation of non-Codal procedural steps will be understood as faux-solemnities urged upon the Court by a zealous Advocate. However, the appropriate efforts of a responsible Advocate are required by the norm of law (Canon 1723).

 Finally, the Reverend Judges recall the force of particular legislation in the application of a penalty for this delict. As cited above, Norm 8 of the 2006 USCCB Essential Norms required that if there is moral certitude about the delict having been committed, then 'permanent removal from ecclesiastical ministry, not excluding dismissal from the clerical state' is indicated.

III. IN FACTO.

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the guiding principle of recent years has always been the 1942 address by Pope Pius XII to the prolate auditors of the Sacred Roman Rota. In that address the Holy Father indicated that the Church's Tribunal system must rest on the finding of truth wherein it is the "the aggregate of proofs and indications" that lead to judge's moral certitude. This being said, it is not necessarily the quantity of evidence that becomes the determinate of probative value, it is how the facts and the details themselves can integrate one with another and come to form a complete picture. Thus, a seeming insufficiency in a singular proof can be completed by the presence of another proof or even a more "indication."

The Tribunal first notes that with regard to the question of determining probative value.

The generally accepted commentary of the Code of Canon Law on the notion of moral certitude defines said moral certitude as "the firm and unwavering assent of the mind to a proposition accepted upon evidence taken from the normal mode of action and human conduct, evidence which the mind finds sufficient to win its full assent." The pursuit of moral certitude entails a quality and qualifiers in our thoughts and deliberations. This Tribunal has maintained a good and clear notion of the standard of proof expected of it and a keen awareness of the true bar to be reached in order to establish such moral certitude.

The Tribunal now addresses the argument of the Advocate for the reus regarding human memory. The Advocate for the reus in this case raises in his brief questions regarding the notion of a malleable "human memory." What the Advocate wishes to do is to call into question the manner in which details can be conveyed to the court in the process of instructing a case after some twenty or thirty years. While there is serious reason to consider these questions (such is the underlying motive for the Church's rules on prescription), some of the Advocate's offerings are not necessarily applicable because they can in no way, in any given case, be proved or disproved.

For example, note the list of "professionally accepted statements" (an assertion which, it self, is given very limited citation and justification) about the use of "post-event information (PEI)." The Advocate conveys that "it is true that such PEI does shape memory but there is no way to determine whether or not 'memories can be created' nor is it possible to, on the face of them, distinguish between a created memory and an actual representation of facts." Given the required evaluation and use of discretion by the judges, the nature, and resolution thereof, of conflicting testimony before a court remains absolutely the same in the judgment process of the officers.

The Advocate also indicates that "people can fill in details of what they think they remember." But here the Advocate's premise argues that there is some greater context that has some degree of truth to it, and only secondary details themselves might be at variance. This creates a problem for the Advocate, who on occasion, will argue that it is in the inaccuracy of detail on the part of witnesses and therefore the greater picture must be called in question. But is this call to the judges actually supported by his premised theory, or is it essentially undermined?

The last point to be made relates to the Advocate's own assertion that "the human memory is malleable, active and vulnerable to various influences." This should be recognized as a statement that, in essence, cuts both ways. To the same extent that whatever circumstance might cause a person to recall or to attribute recollections to the actions of another when they are in the position of taleged victim or witness, would seem to hold equally applicable to the memory of the reus. It seems logical to assert that after twenty or thirty years from the incident being denied, the reus likewise can have an equally strong belief in his own innocence. Could not his own memory of the circumstances or even the facts have been marred by this same factor of malleability. This, according to the Advocate's premise, might be the case even without broaching the possibility of intentional fabrication or obscuring of facts.

The Advocate indicates that a person (the one making the allegation) may look at otherwise innocent behavior and attribute to it the look of sexual abuse. It would seem possible to also say that a person (the one accused) could, in retrospect, look at behaviors that might constitute sexual abuse and through the lens of their own mind and their own malleable memory see only innocent behavior on their own part, especially since it is a common human trait to rationalize one's own behavior.

Given these preliminary observations, the Court now addresses the issue that there were other witnesses, in addition to those mentioned above, that were willing to testify to the good character of the reus. However, in this regard, the prosecuting attorney in the civil trial of the reus made the following observation:

Nobody has gotten up and said Father Knighton is a terrible human being. Nobody's asking you to judge his worth as a human being. You're asked to decide whether or not he assaulted a person. Good people do things that are crimes. Bad people do good things. [Civil Trial, Afternoon, August 22, 2003, page 163].

In response to the allegations, the testimony of opposing witnesses and other material in the acta, his Advocate presents the perspective of the reus. In general, this comprises reiterations of innocence and the presentation of character witnesses. The Advocate also attempts to impeach the credibility and the veracity of the accusers. The Advocate emphasizes the problems the complainants were experiencing in their lives at the time of the alleged incidents of abuse and the dysfunction in their families. But, it must be noted that conversely, the reus' ability to detect such dysfunction could be understood to have made them candidates for such exploitation.

The complaints were only placed years after the alleged abuse; clinicians cited in the Law Section speak commonly of the lengthy passage of time before such behavior is shared. The Advocate used terms such as "transference" and "flashbacks" in an attempt to discredit the complainants; however, the Advocate did not develop a logical, cogent argument about these matters. The Advocate presents the verdict of civil suit as a proof of the innocence of the reus. The Advocate has placed a great deal of evidentiary weight on letters of support, as well as the testimony of friends; while such material demonstrates that the reus was successful in some of his ministry, it does not directly address the issues in the formulation of the doubt

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Indeed, while many of the things the reus has done may not be classified in the technical sense as crimes either in canon or civil law, the fact is that he has demonstrated from the beginning of his elerical life on March 7, 1972, that he does not feel bound to observe church law and its concomitant disciplines, or be obedient to lawful church authority if that mean contradicting his own wishes. His own friend, candidly states:

Mary has always talked about his great love for the priesthood and felt that that was his calling and his vocation. Yet at the same time, he wanted to do what he felt he wanted to do. Authority is one big hurdle for Mary, and that has always been a hurdle for Mary [Penal Trial, Witness "K", page 18].

had previously given an example of this in his testimony:

We were at the seminary at that time in the theologate. Father lived at Holy Angels, as a seminarian at that time. He did not live on the seminary campus which was required, and somehow he was able to exceed that requirement [Penal Trial, Witness "K", page 3].

While there the reus gave people the impression he was a legitimately sanctioned church minister. While there he committed an offense against the sixth commandment with An offense that likely would not have occurred if he had been living at the major seminary with the rest of his ordination class.

The investigator assigned to the case of the reus, Robert Beyer, makes the following statement after reviewing Archdiocesan files of the reus:

His records reflect that he is an independent person. He took a job at Whitnall High School, and adopted three sons without first discussing the situation with the Archdiocese, and without prior approval from the Archdishop. There is correspondence in his file, which was written by Fr. Knighton, indicating that he does not like to live in a rectory setting, but prefers to have the privacy of living by himself. Fr. Knighton has not always been happy with his assignments and has let the Archdiocese know about it through correspondence. There is correspondence in his file indicating that he has done a good job in his assignments and was well liked. But there is also correspondence which is critical of his job performance [Tribunal File, "Confidential Sexual Abuse Investigation", page 066].

Not only Mr. Beyer, but anyone who reviewed the correspondence of the *reus* with his lawful superiors, would arrive at a similar assessment. (Notable here also is the eventually lived contradiction to his expressed preference to live "by himself.") The Advocate tries to rationalize this behavior in relation to superiors with this defense:

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While it is admitted that Father Knighton has not always acted in accord with the wishes of his bishop, he nonetheless has acted in an opright, moral manner. He has always followed his conscience to meet the moral obligations of a priest to the needs of the Church and its people. There has never been any punishment or penal sanction placed against Father Knighton for his actions. True, Father Knighton is not a submissive, compliant, and passive priest. Yes, there are copies of letters and materials from and to Father Knighton in the acts. Father Knighton can be direct, fortbright, blunt, outspoken - all good American qualities.

During his priestly career, Father Knighton kept writing to his archbishop, communicating with him, sharing with him his hopes, his goals, his convictions, his respect and affection, along with his anger and frustration about various things. It is true that Father Knighton takes initiative; therefore he is not passive and submissive. Who would want a leader or a priest who is passive and submissive? Among some clergy it has been a common saying to state. "It is always easier to ask for forgiveness than it is to ask for permission." While a canonist or a legislator might not so quickly express such a statement, the practical and pastoral minded among the elergy frequently do so. Certainly, Father Knighton seems to have held this sentiment [Defense Brief]

to function on sentiment rather than canons and legislation. A blatant example of this is found in the September 11, 1988 letter of the reus in which he informs his lawful superior, Archbishop Rembert Weakland, that he is finalizing his adoption of a ten year old boy and a six year old boy [Clergy File, pages 216-217]. The Archbishop replies:

Unfortunately, the Advocate for the reus, like the reus himself, might desire this Tribunal

You have a pattern of doing what you please and then informing superiors. I simply want to go on record that I have not given you my permission to adopt the two children that you speak of in your letter.

You cannot continue, Mary, to go on just doing what you please and then informing the rest of us later and expect that God's blessings will be abundant on your life and on your ministry [Clergy File, pages 218].

The September 22, 1988 letter of the raus in reply to this letter of the Archbishop clearly demonstrates that he will accept no one's judgment of him or his ministry. He alone decides whether he is a "faithful" priest. This can be seen in the following lengthy, verbatim excerpt from that letter:

 Your last paragraph bothered me even more! "You cannot continue, Mary, to go on just doing what you please..." Your generalities, your judgemental comments are enough to make me disgorge.

I have been a priest for this Archdiocese for thirteen years. I was ordained by the late and loving Archbishop William E. Cousins. I served at St. Anne's parish on the north side for one year. I was then assigned to Pius XI High School in 1976 and remained there until 1987. Now, could you please have the courtesy of being specific how I have been doing as I please?

When I sought to look for a job in the public school, I came to you seeking your opinion. Sure I sent out applications, but I was open to your opinions and would have respected it.

As priest, I haven't been charged with any legal offense in this city nor state that would cause embarrassment to the priesthood. As priest I have not done anything against the Code of Cannon Law that would cause me to be tagged as "doing as I please." I have in my estimation have been faithful as a servant; people would vouch for that!

Maybe the difficulties doesn't lie with me Rembert. Maybe the difficulty is with you and your uncomfortableness of dealing with me and anyone who strive to be free in living the Gospel. By free, please don't interpret it doing what I damn well please. Maybe your uncomfortableness of relating with those who disagree with you is your problem. It seems that one can never disagree with you or be their own person. If they choose to do so, they are left in the cold! This has been my experience with you in the pass and I choose not to allow that as an hindrance to my growth as person and priest.

If I am such a problem to you as you mentioned; I am willing, and this I mean I am most willing to leave and go elsewhere. I don't need this rash judging that I have received from you or anyone else because they fail to know who I am really am. I am fired of being judged from afar.

I gather you are under much stress with this event of Mr. and now the passing of a good man. Archbishop William E. Cousins. Whatever is going with you; you must realize that I am not a lap dog and such unfounded comments and criticism I don't appreciate. I find it most uncharitable, offensive and totally unfair

to me and how I've served in this diocese [Clergy File, pages 224-225].

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By comparing this letter to the fullness of material in his <u>Clergy File</u>, it can be noted that the reus apparently glosses over both the abrupt ending of his multi-year assignment to St. Anne's parish, and the manner in which he was "assigned" to Pius XI High School. The reus sent a copy of this letter to the auxiliary bishop, the Most Reverond Richard J. Sklba, who sent a reply dated October 13, 1988. In this reply Bishop Sklba notes: "I do know that a vast number of priests feel that you have charted your own course without much prior consultation." [Clergy File, pages 229]

A review of the <u>Chancery File</u> clearly indicates that the reus had conflicts with this same Archbishop William E. Cousins, whom he tries to portray as understanding him so much better than Archbishop Weakland. In his letter dated July 13, 1975 (barely nineteen days after he was ordained a priest by this same Archbishop Cousins) the reus writes the following:

 To go to St. Ann's on a full-time basis at this point would be unfair to the people, to the Team and to myself, my heart is not there and would not be there. To go there by force would be done out of Blind Obedience and that I don't believe in. [Chancery File, page 023].

In his reply, Archbishop Cousins reminds the reus of the promise of obedience that he had publicly made in his recent ordination ceremony:

 The question now concerns your carrying out of the promise of obedience you made upon the occasion of your Ordination. You say in your letter, "I promised obedience to you and your successors. I promised these vows, and by the Grace of the Father, I will keep them". This is all that is being asked of you. Your implied insistence upon an appointment to Pius XI High School is at variance with your consistent statements that it is your desire to serve. You must immediately recognize that service cannot be confined or restricted to personal preference [Chancery File, page 024].

Even his friend and classmate, states: "I think Marv has always found it relatively easy for him to exceed regulations and discipline that did not suit his purpose" [Penal Trial Testimony, Witness "K", page 5].

Having established that the reus alone decides for himself what his proper actions are, the Tribunal notes the following defense statement of the Advocate:

In the case at hand, Father Knighton has a long history of involvement with both the education and pastoral care of young people. Indeed, many years ago a number of boys went swimming

together with Father Knighton. Three of the boys from that long history now accuse Pather Knighton of sexual misconduct. The three accusers seem each to come from troubled backgrounds. There seems to be some interconnection between or among them, though it seems the accusers deny it. The issue of their motivation in bringing forward these allegations is questionable. It would be expected that many accusers would have emerged if Father Knighton were really a predator of 13 and 14 year olds. It would also be expected that an adoption agency or child protective services would have discovered something in its examination of Father Knighton's readiness to adopt. Given that no other accusers have come forward and given that no adoption agencies or child protection services have made any allegations, all the more it would seem that Father Knighton is innocent of the allegations made by these 3 individuals [Advocate's Brief]

The Tribunal gives no weight to this defense, since the allegations set before this Tribunal do not include one that designates the reus as a "predator of 13 and 14 year olds". What is at issue is whether or not a delict against the Sixth Commandment of the Decalogue was committed by the reus with one or more minors. Since there are no direct witnesses to what took place other than the reus and his accusers, the Tribunal carefully sets forth in the following arguments concerning two accusers of the reus why it questions the credibility of the reus and not that of his accusers.

 The Tribunal will address the accusations in chronological order to show that the same attitude motivated the conduct of the *reus* with all his accusers, namely that each was to give him what he wanted, when he wanted, because of his sense of entitlement. The Tribunal begins with the allegation of _______ The Advocate insisted this allegation be dropped since it was evident that this incident took place before the *reus* became a deacon. This Advocate argues:

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It is not an incidental matter whether Father Knighton was ordained a deacon at the time of the alleged events. The crime of which he has been reus is that of sexually abusing a minor – not while as a lay person, but while a cleric in major orders. If Father Knighton was not yet ordained a deacon, then the gravius delictum of which he has been reus could not have taken place. According to the terms of The Essential Norms and of Sacramentorum sanctitatis tutela, it is a constitutive element of this gravius delictum that the act of sexual abuse of a minor be committed by one who is a priest or deacon. As will be explained below, for reasons of law this allegation should not be included in this proceeding [Advocate's Brief]

While acknowledging most of the above as accurate, the Tribunal distinguishes by noting that "the crime of which he has been accused is that of sexually abusing a minor — not while as a lay person, but while a cleric." The advocate carries his sentence too far by adding that the reus

was not "a cleric in major orders". It is indisputable that this delict took place under the norms of the 1917 Code of Canon Law (CIC). By the terms of that same CIC, Marvin T. Knighton was admitted to the clerical state by the act of tonsure (1917 CIC, Canon 108 §1), which he received on March 7, 1972. The Motu Proprio of Pope Paul VI, Ministeria quaedam — redefining admission to the clerical state as ordination to the diaconate — was issued on August 15, 1972. This document does not specify that those already admitted to the clerical state by tonsure were no longer to be regarded as clerics until their ordination to the diaconate.

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The question of one's state in life at a given moment in time is mere fact and not a matter of penal law. Thus, it is documentary and not open to broadened or narrowed interpretation. Furthermore, the distinction that has occurred since 1972 when tonsure was still the initiating point of one's cleric state and the present, is the fact that under the old system (long pre-dating the socio-pastoral milieu of the 1970's) there was not perceived to be any likelihood in the seminary system of the day for any "ministry" entailing interactions with vulnerable persons being performed by persons other than deacons or priests. But, the reus, in retrospect, with his rather consistent desire to go against the systematic formation process expected of him by lawful superiors, decided of his own accord that he was ready to perform public ministry. He was presumably ready also to take on that public authority, or at least the airs of it, that comes from being a seminarian living outside the seminary community. It seems that the reus intentionally created the circumstance where he went beyond the situation anticipated by law, and placed himself in the role previously expected of only priests or deacons. By doing this he himself created the circumstance where he could possibly then have taken advantage of some imputed "position" in order to commit this delict.

 The Promoter addresses this question with precision. He indicates that a distinction needs to be made between canons 2358 and 2359 in the 1917 CIC. Canon 2358, which has no parallel in the 1983 Code, applies to those in minor orders the norms of canon 2357. This means that a sin against the sixth commandment of the Decalogue can occur. But the parallel drawn into the 1983 Code, that of Canon 2359 §2, is the first to introduce the notion of a crime against a minor below the age of 16. The problem with the argument of the Advocate for the reus is that the narrowness that he seeks is based on a presumption within the law and within the formation structures of the Church at that time that those in minor orders would not be placed in any circumstances where they interacted with minors under the age of 16. It seems disingenuous for the reus to wish to avail himself of the distinction which becomes a protection, when he was unwilling at the time to adhere to the formational parameters that would not have allowed this circumstance to have arisen in the first place.

In asking the learned opinion of Bishop Thomas Doran, DD, JCD, on this matter, Bishop Doran stated that Canon 1395, as interpreted by the American Procedural Norms — which Bishop Doran helped to draft and finalize, envisions that offenses before ordination to the diaconate be included. Bishop Doran also indicated that elevical status is not affected by penal law, nor by the subsequent restructuring of how one enters the clerical state. If a person was a cleric under the Pio-Benedictive Code, he does not lose that status simply because under the current code a man does not become a cleric until he is ordained to the diaconate.

1 2	The Promoter notes the following regarding this allegation, which this Tribunal judges to be an accurate assessment of the credibility of and the guilt of the reas (the Tribunal
3 4	excerpts at length):
5	is hazy about some of the details of date and physical
6	location, but he is very clear in his recollection of the incident,
7	itself: "Father got into the same bed with me. It was just the two of
8	us. There was just the one bed Father was] maked from the waist
9 10	down I was laying next to him. He turned on his side, and almost in a spooning type fashion with me behind him. He took my
11	hand, placed it on his penis and as it got erect, his hand was on top
12	of my hand in a masturbating function until the act was complete."
13	[Penal Trial, Witness "G" pages 5 & 20-21]
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1.5	said that after the event was over, he was not particularly
16	bothered by what had happened and that, at the time, he did not
17	feel it had been inappropriate behavior; rather, "from that time
18	forward, that essentially ended the relationship I had with Father
19 20	Marvin, and he's the one that ended the relationship, which was probably the most devastating part of all that occurred with him
21	was the fact that, for whatever reason, I was being discarded by
22	him and no longer considered a friend. He no longer took me to
23	movies or any of those things. He just pretty much threw me out"
24	[Penal Trial, Witness "G" pages 5 & 12]. Contends that he
25	never suffered from "repressed memory" concerning Father
26	Knighton's actions, but that it was not until he underwent therapy
27	for that he came to appreciate the long-term
28	impact which the sexual abuse had on him. [Penal Trial, Witness
29	"G", page 11]
30	In his testimony, referred to Father Knighton's "constant
31 32	hugging and kissing," [Penal Trial, Witness "G", pages 10 & 20]
33	but cited no other actions which he would describe as "grooming"
34	or sexually inappropriate behavior, and he is unequivocal in his
35	insistence that this occurrence was a one-time event. He does,
36	however, testify that a who
37	"Dad a very similar
38	relationship with Father Marvin," and he insinuates that may
39	have been abused by Father Knighton, as well. [Penal Trial,
40	Witness "G", pages 8!
41 42	is very candid about his own troubled background, which
43	included and the
44	at his public
45	high school teachers (Penal Trial, Wifness "G", pages 28-29]. Yet

there is nothing in his testimony to suggest that he is either

embellishing or overly dramatizing his story, nor is there any indication that he harbors a lingering hostility toward either Father Knighton or the Church [Penal Trial, Witness "G", pages 41-42].

It is unfortunate that medical circumstances prevented from appearing in person to give his testimony inasmuch as observing his "body language" might have been helpful to the members of the Tribunal in assessing his credibility. Still, in recalling the tone and content of his telephonic responses to the judges' questions and in reading the transcript of that session, I cannot detect even the slightest basis for challenging his integrity or credibility.

For his part, Father Knighton acknowledged that there was an occasion on which s, along with him; but he contended that, if such a visit had happened, it would have taken place at the parish rectory and the boys would have stayed in one of the guest rooms [Penal Trie], Witness "A", pages 5-10]. Father Knighton vaguely remembered the boys, but was mable to recall much detail, maintaining that contact with these boys had occurred early in his stay at Holy Angels and long before his ordination to the diaconate [Penal Trial]. Witness "A", pages 8-9 & 17]. He admitted that it was "part of my nature" to hug people, provided they are comfortable with such gestures [Penal Trial, Witness "A", pages 17-18].

While Father Knighton's poor recollection of details is understandable, given that the events in question transpired more than thirty years ago, the Tribunal does have access to documentary evidence which could be held to constitute a recent admission on Father Knighton's part that some manner of inappropriate behavior involving had, indeed, occurred. The admission was reported by Dr. Barbara Reinke (Director of Project Benjamin - the office created by the Archdiocese of Milwankee in 1989 to respond to incidents of sexual abuse — in a log entry dated April 11, 2002, and entitled: "Addendum to the note about Father Mary Knighton." The note reads in part: "During this conversation [a telephone call from Father Knighton to Dr. Reinke] Father Mary admitted that he had 'made a mistake' in the incident with the insisted that this incident occurred in 1973, prior to his being ordeined a deacon, and thus his behavior does not concern us" [Chancery File, page 3/41.

but he was quizzed about it by Mr. Not only did he make this statement to 2 Beyer. 3 đ, When I asked Fr. Knighton if the allegation was true, he stated, 5 "There was inappropriate behavior". When questioned further Fr. 6 Knighton responded, "No comment", and told me that he had 7 nothing else to say about it. Fr. Knighton acknowledged that the 8 inappropriate behavior was with _____ I asked Fr. Knighton if 9 the inappropriate behavior was of a sexual nature. He again told me that he had nothing more to say about it [Tribunal File, 10 "Confidential Sexual Abuse Investigation", pages 55-56]. 11 12 The Court does not find convincing the Advocate's attempt to change the meaning of this 13 14 remark of the reus by stating the following: 15 According to diocesan notes, Father Knighton was said to have 16 "rnade a mistake" about the incident in later contact with the 17 archdiocese. This misinterpretation by diocesan officials stems 18 from the fact that Father Knighton only indicated that he was at 19 Holy Angels Church in 1972 and 1973. The "mistake" was about 20 the years being discussed. The alleged incident could not have 21 taken place in winter 1975-76 when was 15 years old 22. since Father Knighton was not at Holy Angels at the time. He also 23 admitted knowing _____, but denied anything occurred and 2,4 25 refused to discuss the matter with any diocesan official due to concerns about his rights which up to that point he felt had been 26 27 trainpled [Advocate's Brief]. 28 This directly contradicts the testimony or in her exchange with Judge 29 30 31 And in the second thing with . I take it he Q, 32 was just as vocal at denying stuff? 33 Well, no, as I said, that one he -- the argument was about 34 Λ. the date it occurred. He wasn't denying it. He was saying 35 it occurred before I was ordained [Penal Trial, Witness "J", 36 37 pages 16-17]. 38 In addition, one of the friends of the reus - principal of Pius XI High School at the time 39 the accusations against the reus became public — was told at that time that the reus admitted to 40 this allegation, although he did not know that this particular allegation came from This 4.) friend states the following in an exchange with Judge concerning the fact that the reus was 42 angry with him for not publicly defending him when the allegations became publicly known: 43 44. 45 We were told that the Diocese had two situations, one of ۸.

which he admitted but it was beyond the statue of

 limitations, and the other one he said didn't happen, and that was going to trial. And I was, therefore, given the information that he admitted one of the allegations, and then the question was how could I defend him, and it's like I can't defend him. Now I've never heard that brought up again since, so I don't know if that's true or not

Q. That Mary admitted it?

A. That's what I was told by an Archdiocesan representative

A. That's what I was told by an Archdiocesan representative back then. [Fonel Trial, Witness "H", page 39].

Moreover, if the interpretation of the Advocate were valid, then the Tribunal would expect that the reus would have "set the record straight" when he was later interviewed by Mr. Beyer. Instead, the nature of his response above indicates that he acknowledges wrongdoing but does not want to specify the nature of his "mistake" [Tribunal File, pages 55-56].

In view of all of the above, the Judges concur with the Promoter that statements are credible. Moreover, they are consistent with those of the other accuser, who testified to the Court about the modus operandi of the rens. Notwithstanding the hints of the Advocate to the contrary, there is absolutely no evidence of collusion between the two gentlemen. It is clear to the Judges that the event concerning took place and it certainly fits into the category of an offense against the Sixth Commandment of the Decalogue.

With respect to the second allegation, this is the most problematic of the three because of significant and willing involvement in this process and the degree and intensity that he brings to his testimony. It can be noted that both the Promoter and the Advocate resort, in a number of circumstances, to the possibility that misunderstood the actions of the reus. All of this set a sarge for boundary issues, both physical and emotional, with minors that seem consistent throughout the ministerial life of the reus. What is in question is whether there are sufficient proofs to indicate that what might otherwise be inappropriate and immature or merely "wrestling and horseplay" can be elevated to the point of being a delict, that is to say a violation of the sixth commandment of the Decalogue with a minor. Both the Promoter and the Advocate raise questions about the nature of the testimony and the overall credibility of in this case, which the Tribunal will now address.

the clinician to whom referred him and who began counseling on a weekly basis in November of 2001, submitted a claim for services twenty weeks later which included an [Chancery File, pages 301-302]. The judges of this tribunal possess a certain familiarity with the diagnostic criteria of and their associated features from their work with marriage nullity cases. Having been presented no reason to question the accuracy of Mr. [Indeed and understanding from the testimony of father, that the erratic behavior pre-dates any of the alleged occurrences of sexual abuse (indeed, has testified that his relationship with his son was "stormy" even prior to the [Penal Trial]

Testimony, B:20-25, Jury Trial Transcripts Vol III:8,12,18,29], it is plausible that the or its untecedent condition(s) bad been a primary determinant of behavior and perceptions long before Father Knighton entered his life. In view of this the Promoter questions whether this disorder may have impacted the nature of states k testimony. In this regard the Court notes that lying, or the inability to discern right from wrong or б muth from fiction, are not characteristics of the Morcover, the following characteristics are not inconsistent with those who are sexually chused and then abandoned. They also account for what the Advocate of the rens says in an attempt to underprine credibility: "I had a troubled and problematic youth" [Advocate's Brief. The DSM-IV notes the following diagnostic criteria: The diagnostic criteria for a 2.7 4] Certainly, if lying, or the inability to discern right from wrong or truth from fiction, were the Defense Lawyer of the reus in the chancecristics of the

secular court action would definitely have mentioned this when he attacked the credibility of However, neither in his opening remarks [Civil Trial, Meaning of August 21, 2003, pages 16-17) nor at the time in which this Defense Lawyer of the reus questions

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does he mention that personality disorder made him incapable of telling the truth [Civil 1 2 Trial, Morning of August 21, 2003, pages 80-128; Afternoon of August 21, 2003, pages 21-72; 3 Afternoon of August 22, 2003, pages 109-112]. Ą The Advocate of the reus and the Promoter of Justice question credibility 5 6 because of inconsistency in some details of his account of what happened. The Advocate says: 7 8 In the case at hand, it is clear that the testimony of the accusers is 9 not reliable. There is confusion in the content of the testimony. 10 Whether the testimony of the witnesses has been corrupted by memories shaped by post event information or whether the 1 testimony has been corrupted by collusion and conspiracy, the 12 testimony clearly is not reliable [Advocate's Brief] 13 14 The Promoter of Justice questions the veracity of stating: 15 16 17 Not only does the testimony eppear to be laced with contradictions. 18 it also appears in some respects to undergo embellishment with the passage of time. While it could be argued that this reflects an 19 emerging clarification of detail as a victim-witness plumbs the 20 21 depths of his memory, I suspect that it could be maintained with 22 just as much validity that we are simply witnessing a 23 demonstration of the adage "practice makes perfect" as applied to 24 the task of crafting one's testimony in order to put forward the most convincing argument [Promoter's Brief] 25 26 However, the key details that support the substance of accusation of sexual 27 28 misconduct against the reus are the same in all of his accounts. The Court does not accept the theory of the Promoter of Justice that the contradictions result from "crafting one's testimony in 29 30 order to put forward the most convincing argument', since that would mean that the testimony given by in the Penal Trial would not omit earlier details that strengthened his case. 31 32 Nor does the Court accept the arguments of the Advocate that testimony "has been corrupted by memories shaped by post event information" or "has been corrupted by collusion and conspiracy." Instead, the Court believes that 33 34 35 sexual actions by the reus that became the criteria for understanding the sexual nature of past 36 actions by the reus that were not perceived as such at the time when they occurred. 37 38 Moreover, the Assistant District Attorney, Tiffin [hereinafter: Tiffin], states to the Juzy: 40 kas been very consistent. He's been very consistent in what happened to him. He's been very consistent when he told Detective Hoppe. He's been very consistent, he didn't tell a lie to

his stepmether and his father. He wasn't ready.

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1 He said, I didn't tell the counselors. He didn't. He wasn't ready. 3 The just told you the fruth. He's hid nothing. ... He had no motive 3 to lie [Civil Trial, Afternoon August 22, 2003, pages 163-164]. 4 The Tribunal concurs with this previously quoted assessment again quoted immediately 5 6 above. The Tribunal further notes that there is no financial motivation for to make such an 7 accusation, since he has not asked the Archdiocese of Milwaukee for any further funds but only 8 for justice. The following exchange with father and the associate judge, the Reverend 9 confirms this: 10 Q 11 Has there been a Jawsuit against the diocese at all? 12 A has made a settlement with the diocese. 13 Q But there's nothing open or outstanding at this point from 14 your perspective. 15 Λ No. 16 17 In his interview with this Iribanal, was rational, lucid and was able to logically 18 form his thoughts. There was no evidence when he appeared personally before this Tribunal, at 19 the Civil Trial of the reus, or in any other context that is a delusional person unable to 20 discern truth from lies or fact from fiction. 21 22 By contrast, the Court finds that the reus definitely lies about key details in order to 23 absolve himself of any blame. He also claims those in authority did not respect his rights. When 24 questioned by his Defense Lawyer in his Civil Trad concerning whether he kissed on the 25 lips, the rens replied uncanivocally: 26 I don't kiss neople on the lips. I never kissed on the lips. 27 [Civil Trial, Morning August 22, 2003, page 143]. 28 29 30 However, father directly witnessed the contrary as can be seen in the following exchange with the associate judge, the Reverend 31 32 33 Did you observe any of this hugging or kissing that Q 34 seems to describe? 35 A No. I would observe Marvin Knighton kissing women on the lips as a greeting [Penal Trial, Witness "B", page 13]. 36 37 38

The reus shows a pattern of being unequivocal about details when it suits his goal, and equivocal with details when that suits him. Another example of this is the refusal of the reus—barely nineteen days after his ordination to the priesthood in which he promised obedience to Archbishop Cousins and his successors—to accept the parish assignment given to him by Archbishop Cousins. The reus states to the Tribunal: "I don't ever recall where I said, 'No, I'm not going there.' I think the assignment that I finally got was St. Anne's, and that's where I went for a year, and then I went into education after that" [Penal Trial, Witness "A", page 77]. While he may not have said the exact words he states, the words he used in his letter of July 13, 1975 to Archbishop Cousins are clear in their implication and intent:

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
To go to St. Ann's on a full-time basis at this point would be unfair to the people, to the Team and to myself, my heart is not there and would not be there. To go there by force would be done out of Blind Obedience and that I don't believe in [Chancery File, page 023]

His account of a preliminary meeting on February 28, 2002 with Fr. Homacek, and Dr. Barbara Reinke states the following in his formal complaint against Dr. Barbara Reinke to the Department of Regulation and Licensing of the State of Wisconsin:

Throughout this process, Jr. Joseph Hornacek and Dr. Barbara Reinke abused their specific roles and responsibilities. It was obvious to me that they both had taken on a prosecutor's role ugainst me" [Clergy File, page 345].

 The mercurial manner of the reus also raises some question. In the aforementioned formal complaint the rens asserts that, after agreeing at this meeting to meet with his "accuser", he had second thoughts after consulting with the Diocesan Lawyer and his own attorney. He only went ahead with the meeting because Fr. Hornacek and Dr. Reinke accused him of trying to "hide something" [Clercy File, page 345]. Fr. Hornacek's log confirms that the reus had second thoughts but states that he and Dr. Reinke explained this was only a "fact-finding meeting". Later Fr. Knighton phoned to ask that the page 072].

This "fact finding" meeting took place on March 8, 2002. The Vicar of Clergy's log regarding this meeting states the following:



Dr. Reinke's log of this same event states:

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Fr. Joe Hornacek, (psychotherapist), (psychotherapist), (cousin of and family friend to ) and I met as scheduled with Fr. Mary Knighton for the purpose of confronting him with
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of' molestation. (Also present Wis (?spelling?) who was brought as a support person by Fr. Mary but also knew well through tutoring at the end of high school). presented binself in a compelling manner. Pr. Mary continued to deny these events, easting as someone who would regularly lie and accuse others falsely. When Fr. Mary brought up events. acknowledged some wrongdoing on his part (getting caught drinking with friends, participating in Marv's sons' usage of offensive words in Korean, though he denied teaching them American slang words). Several persons attempted to ask Fr. Mary why would make these allegations now if they were not true. had an outburst in which he called Fr. Mary a liar. The meeting ended when it became clear that nothing more could be accomplished [Tribunal File, page 003].

Dr. Reinke on March 9, 2002 notes the following:

Fr. Joe and I conferred. Neither Fr. Joe nor I doubt the truth of story. Joe does not find Fr. Mary amenable to treatment and I questioned what its value would be. Joe and I discussed as next steps that he would make Maureen Gallagher aware of these allegations as she is Fr. Mary's current supervisor, and that he would discuss appropriate restrictions with the Archbishop. Both Fr. Joe and I believe Fr. Mary should not have any one-on-one contact with minors, with the potential that this would make moot his current interest in obtaining a position as a principal [Tribunal File, page 003]

The reus gives this account of that neeting in his formal complaint — dated July 12, 2004 — against Dr. Barbara Reinke for unprofessional conduct to the Department of Regulation and Licensing of the State of Wisconsin:

Triday, March 8, 2002 was the day that I met with my accuser. At the end of that meeting, Dr. Barbara Reinke asked my accuser if I had ever touched him or him me inappropriately. His response to that question was, "No, in no way did Marv ever do anything like that." The tragedy following that meeting was, that my accuser must have spoken with someone following that meeting, for when he later met with the District Attorney, the information he gave to him or her is quite different. In substance, he changed his story about three times. [Clergy File, page 345-346].

Fr. Knighton repeats this rather unique interpretation of what happened at that meeting when giving his testimony to this Tribunal on September 21, 2006: "In relationship to when I had to meet with him, he was specifically asked whether or not I ever touched him

or made bim touch me inappropriately, and he flatly said no" [Penal Trial, Witness "A", page 67]. At the time this statement was made, the Judges did not have available to them the above logs or the above mentioned letter to the Department of Regulation and Licensing of the State of Wisconsin. Thus, the truthfulness or falsity of this statement could not be challenged at that time.

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It is conceivable that such a statement may have been omitted by one but not by four different participants in that same March 8, 2002 meeting. For not only the logs of the Vicar of Clergy and Dr. Reinke quoted above, but also the testimony of and that of his stepmother make no mention of this admission by that the reus was innocent of any delict against the sixth commandment of the Decalogue.

Even if there was some kind of conspiracy on the part of the staff of the Archdiocese and and his witnesses to conceal this alleged exoneration of the reus—which there is no shred of evidence to support—certainly the Defense Lawyer of the reus would have mentioned such a powerful piece of evidence during the civil trial proceedings of August 21-22, 2003 to support his client's innocence. However, there is no record of this alleged statement of in Defense Lawyer's cross examination of Dr. Barbara Reinke, who was present at that March 8, 2002 meeting [Civil Trial, Afternoon of August 21, 2003, pages 21-31]. Nor was this brought up in the cross examination of the by this same Defense Lawyer of the reus [Civil Trial, Afternoon of August 21, 2003, pages 32-73]. Most of all it was not part of the extensive examination of the reus by his own Defense Lawyer [Civil Trial, Morning of August 22, 2003, pages 117-145 and Civil Trial. Afternoon of August 22, 2003, pages 3-61]. The Court can only conclude that this is a lie on the part of the reus to cast doubt on the veracity of an attempt to support his allegation that the Arch diocese did not respect his rights.

Another crucial detail is whether the reus was ever alone with a minor that he brought to the Archbishop Cousin's Center to play bashetball or go swimming. Hartmann questioned the reus on September 21, 2005;

Q. So it was always during the day that you brought kids?

A. Yes.

 Q. Did you have access to the building at night?
 A. No. And, again, I want to emphasize that there was always

usually another adult with me in a group [Penal Trial, testimony of Witness "A", page 41].

 However, from personal knowledge and direct observation, one of the associate judges—who attended St. Francis de Sales Seminary for nine years adjacent to the Archbishop Cousins Catholic Center, and having used these same facilities—in question with regularity during that time and, following on that, having worked at the Archbishop Cousin Catholic Center for the last nine years with access to these some facilities—informed the praises and the other associate judge that on more than one occasion he personally witnessed the reus alone with a minor, or minors at these facilities. Consequently, it is a lie that the reus was never alone with "kids" as the reus alleges above.

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A further instance of what the Tribunal can only conclude is another deliberate lie on the part of the reas is his testimony that called him "gay" at their first meeting [Civil Trial, Afternoon August 22, 2003, pages 163-164; and [Penal Trial, Witness "A", page 50]. When questioned about this at the Penal Trial, had this exchange with the praeses:

Q. Otay. Do you recall was it either at that point or shortly

- Q. Otay. Do you recall was it either at that point or shortly after that you were dismayed by his touching and accused him of being gay?
- A. Never once did I ever accuse him of being gay. Yeah, I have a lot of feelings and emotions that This is intense. You know, and that's something that came up during the trial that I heard of for the first time [Penal Trial, Witness "D", page 6].

If actually stated that the reus was "gay", as the reus alleges above, why would the reus risk possible future charges of sexual misconduct by allowing to stay alone at his house with no other person present on some fourteen separate days from June 22, 1987 to May 18, 1989 [Civil Trial, Afternoon of August 22, 2003, pages 7-11] during a time in which he had not yet adopted his children, who came on July 3, 1989 at 7:24 in the evening [Civil Trial, Afternoon August 22, 2003, page 11]? However, if never said this and made no altegations to anyone about inappropriate conduct by the reus before 1993, then the following question proposed by the Advocate is answered:

If Mr. was so uncomfortable with what he perceived to be Father Knighton's sexual misconduct, why did Mr. keep returning to Father Knighton's home? It might be understandable that he returned a couple of more times. But if he were truly uncomfortable, surely he would have found an excuse not to return so many times as he says [Advocate's Brief].

Essentially, the logic of the reus' own advocate once again cuts both ways. Furthermore, in regards to the number of visits made by to the home of the reus, the Tribunal notes that the first characteristic of the avoid real or imagined abandonment. was emotionally tied to the reus and did not want the reus to abandon him as he perceived his had not yet had the therapy that enabled him to identify that he had been used for the sexual gratification of the reus.

Given that there were no formal charges made against him, the Tribbonal questions why the rens — shoully after his encounter with father and after his meeting with the Archdiocesan lawyer — would write a letter (dated November 15, 1993) to the Vicar of Clergy, informing the Vicar that the rens was going to work in Phoenix, when he had given the Archdiocese no previous notification that he was considering moving there [Clergy File, # 974, page 067]. In responding to the March 23, 1994 letter of the rens to move to Phoenix, Archbishop Weakland, in his letter of March 28, 1994, stated the following:

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I would like to state in writing what I said in our conversation. I do not want at this point of history to give permission for anyone to be on loan to another diocese. If you wish to make that change, then you must do so with the intention of incardination into Phoenix [Clergy Pile, page 249].

The rens, however, gives the impression in the following response during his Civil Trial that the Archbishop did not want him to incardinate in the Diocese of Phoenix and that was why he was unable to do so. The rens states the following:

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I stayed in Milwaukee until 1994. And I went to Phoenix to work in a public school. I wanted to work for the Diocese in Phoenix, but there were some things that happened that I was not able to work, because the bishop here at the time did not want me to go, and wanted me to stay here. And he just said, fine, if you want to go there and work just work, but I really don't want you to leave. So I took a semester — I mean I took a personal leave [Civil Trial, Morning August 22, 2003, page 124].

In point of fact, in seeking incardination the reus gave permission — in his letter of June 6, 1994 — for his Clergy Personnel File to be sent to the Bishop of Phoenix [Clergy File, page 253]. This file held no record of any accusations of sexual impropriety but it did clearly define that the reus had his own understanding of what obedience to his Bishop means. Following reception of this information, the Bishop of Phoenix told the reus he could not accept him into the incardination process for his diocese [Clergy File, page 256].

 From 1994 until 2000, the reus went back and forth between assignments in Milwaukee and positions in various public school systems within the Diocese of Phoenix. These relocations seem to have been made in an attempt to change the mind of Bishop O'Brien and enter the incardination process for the Phoenix Diocese. His last attempt in this regard was to secure a position in a Diocesan High School in Phoenix, which he was able to do only after the following recommendation in the June 5, 2000 letter of the Vicar of Clergy in Milwaukee to the vicar for Clergy in Phoenix:

There has never been cause to withdraw Father Knighton's faculties nor to curtail his ministry in the Archdiocese of Milwaukee. He is not now, and has not been, under any ecclesiastical penalty. There is nothing in his background that would require us to limit any ministry with children. To the best of our knowledge, he does not suffer from any untreated substance abuse problem [Clergy File, page 299].

While this recommendation is itself questionable in many ways, it is hard to reconcile this letter with the allegation of the reus that this particular Vicar of Clergy was a racist. In fact, when was asked about this specific allegation, he replied: "I've known Fr.

as long as I had been in Milwaukee. I've never know him to be racist or accused of any racist practices" [Penal Trial, Witness "K", page 2].

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Following the reception of the above letter from the Vicar of Clergy, Bishop O'Brien — in a letter dated August 21, 2000 — granted faculties to the reus and stated: "I wish you well in your important ministry to our youth as the Campus Minister at St. Mary's High School" [Clergy File, page 301]. Apparently, the reus decided that Bishop O'Brien still would not change his mind about the process of incardination, so the reus returned to Milwaukee, once again seeking another assignment. At that time the Archbishop appointed the reus as "a consultant in the Office for Child, School and Youth Ministry" effective September 1, 2001 [Clergy File, p. 316]. This position was only funded for a year, so the reus would again be seeking another educational assignment on February 20, 2002 [Clergy File, page 071]. On February 25, 2002 brings his accusations to the Archdiocese of Milwaukee in an interview with Dr. Barbara Reinke, the head of Project Benjamin [Tribunal File, pages 001-002].

Given all of the above, the Tribunal judges that the reus had a sexual encounter with the sixteen year old just prior to the arrival of his adopted children, some time during May 15-18, 1989 when stayed with the reus. This fits all the facts in this case. The basement was remodeled [Civil Trial, Morning August 22, 2003, p. 111] and had the sofa bed that consistently refers to in all his accounts. The reus admitted that he had such a sofa bed in 1989 [Civil Trial, Afternoon August 22, 2003, p. 16]. This is also the last time the reus admits that stayed overnight at his house before his two adopted sons came to live with him and occupy the first floor sleeping arrangements [Civil Trial, Afternoon August 22, 2003, p. 11].

 The praeses knows from personal experience that a traumatic event can cause the mind to focus on a particular detail to the exclusion of other details, even ones that would help others to see the truth of the event. As context, what happened is that the praeses was involved in a car accident caused by someone becoming impatient and moving into the intersection before they had a green light. Even to this day, the praeses vividly recalls seeing the car in the middle of the intersection waiting to turn left because traffic was coming from the opposite direction in which the praeses was proceeding and only registering the fact that the light was green and that car should not have been in the intersection. In explaining to the Police Officer what happened the detail that the praeses focused on was the green light, excluding the important detail that traffic was coming from the opposite direction and that traffic prevented the car situated in the intersection from turning or the praeses from swerving into the opposite lane to avoid hitting that same car.

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Afternoon August 22, 2003, page 581.

In point of fact, 'nowever, the practice of the Archdiocese at that time was not to act on any rumors or anonymous accusations but to intervene only when a definite accusation was

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presented to the Archdiocese by a definite person. This did not happen in person until February 1 2 25, 2002. 3 The evidence demonstrates that had not yet reached the stage where he was 4 emotionally ready to present such an accusation of his own accord. At the urging of his 5 did consult a civil attorney, Nick Kostich in 1993. However, the Defense stepmother, Attorney's detailed examination of why did this shows that by that time 7 tell Kostich only the same vague information that bad previously told his stepmother and father [Civil Trial, Afternoon August 21, 2003, pages 58-66]. 4 had fifteen sessions with a psychotherapist. Yet despite this therapeutic 10 environment, was still not yet ready to discuss the actions of the reus [Civil Trial, Morning 11 of August 21, 2003, pages 127-129; Civil Trial, Afternoon August 22, 2003, page 105-108], In 12. fact in an interview - appearing in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel on June 19, 2002, prior to 13 the Civil Trial of the reus - Marie Rohde, a staff member of that local newspaper, records in the 14 course of her interview with the following incident that took place at the March 8, 2002 15 16 mecting: 17 At the meeting, Knighton denied any misconduct, said. A 18 woman who was a teacher at the school came with Knighton and 19 asked why he hadn't come to her if he had been abused. 20 21 "I told her that she didn't know how many times I sat outside her 22 house, but I couldn't tell anyone about it," said Tribunal 23 24 File, page 238]. 25 Despite the attempts of the Defense Lawyer for the reur to present as telling 26 different versions of his accusations [Civil Trial, Afternoon Angust 22, 2003, pages 152-154]; 27 Tiffin rightly presents to the jury that accusations only changed by becoming more 28 detailed as he came to greater awareness through therapy of the true meaning of what actually 29 was done to him by the reas and was enabled to speak more openly about it to others: 30 31 32 didn't tell inconsistent stories. An inconsistent story is somebody saying, X, Y and Z happened to me, and my brother 33 34 was there and the brother geiting on the witness stand and saying, I wasn't there, it didn't happen. That's an inconsistent story. 35 has been very consistent. He's been very consistent in what 36 improved to him. He's been very consistent when he told 37 Detective Hoppe. He's been very consistent, he didn't tell a fic to 38 his stepmother and his father. 39 40 He wasn't ready, He said, I didn't tell the counselors. He didn't. 41 He wasn't ready. The just told you tho truth. The's hid nothing. 42 And the State does bear the burden of proof. And it comes down 43 to whether or not you believe and watching him and

what he has told you, he fold the truth in going through this. He

had no motive to lie. He had no motive to come forward in 2002 to go to the Catholic Church and say this. He was telling the truth. [Civil Trial, Afternoon August 22, 2003, pages 163-164].

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This Tribunal judges that is telling the truth concerning his sexual abuse by the reus. The law section above makes clear that an offense against the Sixth Commandment of the Decalogue is not confined to genital contact leading to orgasm. What describes in the Civil Trial of the reus as "humping" [Civil Trial, Morning August 21, 2003, page 52] and before this Tribunal as "grinding" [Penal Trial, Witness "D", pages 12-13] are acts of frottage which fit the descriptions given in the law section above for a delict against the Sixth Commandment of the Decalogue

This Tribunal judges that the reus was so psychologically and sexually driven that he believed that he was somehow invincible in regard to any possible accusation of wrong doing. Not only did he feel invincible, but he truly rationalized his behavior as something that was normal or acceptable. He definitely did not, and does not, take into consideration the consequences of his decisions. If he feels that some sort of physical contact is called for in a situation, he will do it no matter how inappropriate it may be. The evidence shows that there is a long standing continuous thread of this type of behavior throughout his interactions with male minors. The Tribunal judges that the evidence is sufficient to lead to an affirmative finding as regards this second allegation.

Regarding the third allegation, both the Promoter and the Advocate in this case make appropriate note of the fact that has not provided a formal, sworn statement either through written regatory or verbal testimony within the context of these canonical proceedings. In fact, it is the case that himself never lodge a formal complaint of sexual abuse against the rens with the Archdiocese of Milwankee. The court does have information indicating that there was discussion between and two investigative persons 1) a detective working for the district attorney of Milwankee County, Wisconsin and 2) an investigator retained by the Archdiocese of Milwankee to consider a preliminary investigation into information that had been brought before archdiocesan and/or civil authorities by an attorney who is related to another accuser in this case through the accuser's stepmother. While the information gathered by these two detectives is compelling and worthy of note, the fact that there is no primary accuser before this Tribunal, nor within the instruction of this case, deprives the judges of the ability to attain any sense of proper moral certitude regarding this allegation. Therefore, the decision will have to be designated as negative.

Thus, having reached moral certitude on the first two allegations and in accord with the norm of law, canonical doctrine and the constant jurisprudence of the Roman dieasteries, considering the facts, the circumstances, the testimonics and the arguments as a whole, this Tribunal of Judges responds affirmatively to the first two questions. Imputability is presumed when there is an external violation of the law.

Norm 8 of the 2006 USCCB Essential Norms requires that if there is moral certitude about the delict baving been committed, then 'permanent removal from ecclesiastical ministry,

not excluding dismissal from the clerical state' is indicated. In accord with the norm of law, the and a 2 penalty of permanent removal from ecclesiastical ministry is imposed. 3 4 5 DISPOSITIVE 6 7 8 ARCHDIOCESE OF MILWAUKEE 9 In view of the foregoing, and with due consideration to the law and its application to the 10 particular circumstances, We the undersigned Judges of the Metropolitan Tribunal of the 11 Archdiocese of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, acting as the judges in this case, do before God, hereby 12 decree, declare and pronounce the following definitive sontence: 13 14 15 To the question "Is the Reverend Marvin T. KNIGHTON guilty of 16 offending against the sixth commandment of the Decalogue with 17 Mr. who had not completed his sixteenth year of 18 age at the time of this offense?", 19 20 we respond IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. 21 22 To the question "Is the Reverend Marvin T. KNIGHTON guilty of 23 24 offending against the sixth commandment of the Decalogue with who had not completed his sixteenth year of 25 age at the time of this offense?", 26 we respond IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. 27 28 29 To the question "Is the Reverend Marvin T. KNIGHTON guilty of 30 offending against the sixth commandment of the Decalogue with 31 32 who had not completed his sixteenth year of 33 age at the time of this offense?", 34 we respond IN THE NEGATIVE. 35 36 Further, attentive to Norm 8 of 2006 USCCB ESSENTIAL NORMS, we impose on the 37 38 Rev. Marvin T. E. Knighton the perpetual penalty of permanent removal from all Reclasiastical Ministry with the admonition that he is to lead a life of prayer and penapee. 39 40 In accord with the particular law currently in force, this includes: 41 42 13 not celebrating Mass publicly, 14 not administering the sacraments (with due regard for canon 976),

not wearing clerical garb and

not presenting himself publicly as a priest,

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Page 38 of 40

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Given the nature of the delicts and the pattern of behavior, the Court further imposes on the Rev. Marvin T. E. Knighton the restriction that, with the exception of persons with whom he has a legal relationship by virtue of full and legal adoption, he never be alone with anyone who is below the age of 18. It is for his Ordinary, the Archbishop of Milwaukee, to determine if further specifications are indicated which may be necessary to implement this penalty and to oversee the cooperation of Fr. Knighton with it.

Further, it is hereby directed that the sentence is to be published according to the norms of law (c. 1615);

In accord with Canon 1628, the Rev. Marvin T. Knighton and the Promoter of Justice are to be instructed that they have a right to appeal to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith against both the Definitive Sentence and the penalty;

 in accord with Canon 1630, any appeal must be introduced within fifteen (15) days of the publication of this Definitive Sentence, and that any appeal is to be communicated to the Judicial Vicar of the Archdiocese of Milwaukee who will transmit it to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith; in accord with Canon 1633 and SST article 23, any appeal must be pursued within one month (30 days) from the date of the introduction of the appeal; for the Rev. Marvin T. Knighton, his Advocate may pursue the appeal in his name;


ii) this decision and the complete acta are to be transmitted to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.

BE IT KNOWN TO ALL

that this case is explicitly subject to the Pontifical Scoret (art. 25, Graviora Delicta, Normae Processuales); this applies to all information, processes and decisions associated with this case (Secreta continere, February 4, 1974 [AAS 66 1974, pages 89-92]).



Signed, decreed, witnessed, notarized and published on the 27th day of July, 2007, at the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, U.S.A.



Ecclesiastical Notary
July 27, 2007

Scal

Associate Judge



Prot. No. 325/200 - 18478

March 24, 2004

Most Reverend Angelo Amato, SDB Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith Palazzo del S. Uffizio 00120 Vatican City

Your Excellency:

Thank you for your inquiry regarding the matter of Reverend Marvin T. Knighton. As I indicated in my previous correspondence, the preliminary investigation in this case was particularly challenging. The original investigator was not able to complete the task satisfactorily to the Diocesan Review Board's standards. A second investigator was then assigned and he completed the task and sent the report to the Diocesan Review Board last week. I have now received their recommendation.

While Father Knighton is referring to one situation in which a criminal trial resulted in an acquittal, there are actually three separate allegations against him by three different alleged victims and a fourth reported second hand by an alleged victim's mother. The attached report outlines the circumstances of those allegations. After preliminary investigation, I am satisfied that these have the semblance of truth to them. You will note that there was no collusion in the presentation of the three reports, that Father admits to one allegation of inappropriate conduct, and that the pattern of behavior described is consistent.

I am enclosing the standard reporting form for these allegations. Given Father Knighton's assignment in or independent employment at high schools over the years, I would not be surprised to learn of additional allegations. Father Knighton has a long history of being extremely independent and not accountable for his actions. His personnel file reveals that he would regularly leave a place of assignment on his own initiative and find employment on his own, only later informing diocesan officials. Against explicit directives, he adopted two children and later, again with no consultation or permission, adopted a third child. He has moved out of and back into the diocese frequently, often with no prior notice.

Given the nature of the alleged and admitted sexual abuse, along with the serious abuse of office, I have pondered long and hard to arrive at an opinion about the most appropriate action to be taken. In order that justice may be made manifest and healing of the victims and the Church may proceed, I am asking that Reverend Marvin Knighton be dismissed ex officio from the clerical state. Whatever financial needs he may have can be negotiated in justice.

Prot. No. 325/200 - 18478 p. 2

If the judgement of Your Excellency is that this case should proceed to a dismissal by decree of your Congregation, I would cede to that judgement. Furthermore, if it is your judgement that this case should proceed through a canonical penal process, I humbly request a dispensation from prescription as well as a sanation of any procedural errors that may have occurred during the time this case was under investigation. The severity and frequency of the offenses are such that it is my opinion that these requests are justified. I look forward to your further instructions in this matter.

With sentiments of deepest esteem, I am,

Sincerely yours in Christ,

Most Reverend Timothy M. Dolan Archbishop of Milwaukee

ARCHDIOCESE OF MILWAUKEE

Prot. No.

Reverend Marvin T. Knighton

Date of Birth:

Presbyteral Ordination: May 24, 1975

Age: 54

Years of Ministry: 29

Diocese of Incardination: Milwaukee Ministry in other Diocese: Phoenix Address:

Phoenix, Arizona 85028

ASSIGNMENTS:

Year	Assignment	Location	Appointment
August 1975 – June 1976 June 1976 – August 1987 August 1987 – August 1988		Milwaukee	In solidum team member Faculty
August 1988 - November 19	91 Pius XI High Schoo	ol Milwaukee	Faculty
November 1991 – July 1992	Unassigned - Temp	Admin ad 5	7. Fred's
July 1992 – July 1994	Mt. Mary College	Milwaukee	Campus minister
July 1994 – June 1995	Leave of Absence 🕴	4	•
June 1995 - December 1995	St. Martin de Porres	Parish Milwai	ikee Pastor
December 1995 - July 1997	All Saints Parish	Milwaukee	Associate pastor
July 1997 – August 1998	Leave of Absence -	schooling	•
August 1998 – July 2000	Dominican High Sch	ool Whitefish	Bay Asst Principal
August 2000 – June 2001	St. Mary High Schoo	l Phoenix, A	AZ Campus minister
August 2001 – April 2002	Archdiocese of Milw	aukee	Education consultant
	:		

ACCUSATIONS:

Year	Victim	Age	Alleged acts	Denunciation
1974 /75		15	Hugging, kissing, forced masturbation at priest's residence; one time; priest admits "inappropriate conduct"	n March 28, 2002
1974/75		?	Not specified beyond "sexual abuse" as reported to the mother and handed on to the Archdiocese	March 3, 2004
1988/89		15	Genital touching; one time; in swimming pool at diocesan pastoral center	July 1, 2002
1989-92		13-15	Hugging, kissing, fondling in priest's residence and in swimming pool at diocesan pastoral center	February 25, 2002

CIVIL PROCEEDINGS

Year	Type/case	Conviction	Sentence
2003	Criminal trial – two counts second degree sexual assault	Acquittal	

MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE DIOCESE

Year	Action
2000	
2002	Requested his resignation from position in Education Office; resignation accepted
	Precept issued (April 1, 2002)
2003	Canonical investigation begun upon completion of criminal trial
	Precept re-issued (September 5, 2003)
2004	Case referred to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith

SUSTENANCE PROVIDED BY THE DIOCESE

Father Knighton is provided with the monthly equivalent of a pensioned priest, \$1,250. He is also provided with health and dental coverage.

RESPONSE / RECOURSE BY THE CLERIC

Year	Action
2002	Denies and allegations, admits to "inappropriate conduct" with but states that because it occurred prior to ordination it is not an issue
2003	Sought hierarchical recourse against "administrative decisions" (not specified to the Archdiocese); continues to threaten legal action against the Archdiocese



00120 Città del Vaticano, Palazzo del S. Uffizio

15 June 2004

325/2003-19268

(In responsione hat mentio builti numeri)

CONFIDENTIAL

Your Excellency,

The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith has received the requested documentation you sent on 24 March 2004 regarding the Reverend Marvin T. KNIGHTON, a priest of your archdiocese who has been accused of sexual abuse of minors.

After a careful study of the facts, this Dicastery at its Particular Congress of 29 May 2004 decided to grant a derogation from the law of prescription and hereby authorises and instructs Your Excellency to conduct a judicial penal process against delicts allegedly committed by Fr. Knighton after his diaconal ordination, that is to say, only those delicts he is alleged to have committed while in the clerical state. Enclosed is a copy of the motu proprio Sacramentorum sanctitatis tutela which contains, apart from particular law for the United States of America, the norms governing such a penal process. Your Excellency is reminded that the acts of the process should kindly be forwarded to this Dicastery upon its completion at first instance.

I take this opportunity to thank Your Excellency for the vigilance that you keep over these serious matters and to offer you my sincere respects. With every best wish, I remain,

Yours devotedly in the Lord,

* Angelo Amato, SDB Titular Archbishop of Sila Secretary

Enclosure

His Excellency
The Most Reverend Timothy M. DOLAN
Archbishop of Milwaukee
3501 South Lake Drive, P.O. Box 070912
Milwaukee, WI, 53207-0912
U.S.A.



August 13, 2007

Marvin T. Knighton



Phoenix, AZ 85028

Dear Mary,

I am sorry to be the one that needs to affirm the fact that the penal trial called for by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith has been completed. The decision of the Tribunal found that crime was committed in two of the three counts presented. The judges have imposed the penalty of permanent restriction from ministry. I presume that you received this information and have discussed it with your canonical advocate.

Given this situation, I am writing to ask you if you would prefer to seek a voluntary laicization from the clerical state. Such a decision on your part may help to bring closure to this experience and help you to move on to a new leg in your life's journey.

Would you kindly respond to this letter in writing by the end of August, 2007? If you should decide to seek voluntary laicization, someone at the archdiocese would be happy to help you with the process.

Thank you for the consideration, Mary. Please know that you are in my prayers daily.

In the Lord Jesus,

Cust

Very Reverend Curt J. Frederick Vicar for Clergy

C: Dr. J. Michael Ritty, advocate



BAC

(x)120 Città del Vaticano, Palazzo del S. Uffizio

31 January 2009

PROT. N. (In responsione fiat mentio buins numeri)

PRO DOCTRINA FIDEI

CONFIDENTIAL

Your Excellency,

I am writing to you regarding the case of Rev. Marvin KNIGHTON, a priest of your Archdiocese who has been accused of the sexual abuse of minors. This Congregation has received from Rev. Knighton an appeal against the sentence, given on 27 July 2007, in the Penal Process carried out at First Instance by the Metropolitan Tribunal of Detroit. Your Excellency has also requested that a more severe penalty be imposed on Rev. Knighton than that given in the Tribunal of First Instance.

The Congregation has authorized the Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Cincinnati to carry out a Penal Process at Second Instance and would therefore kindly request that Your Excellency ensure that all of the Acta pertaining to this case are forwarded to the said Second Instance Tribunal. Your own concerns regarding the penalty imposed should also be included. Your request should be construed as a petition that the Promoter of Justice in Second Instance file for a dimissio in poenam.

Thanking you for your assistance in this matter, with prayerful support and best wishes, I remain

Sincerely yours in Christ,

* Luis F. LADARIA, S.J.

Titular Archbishop of Thibica

Secretary

His Excellency
Most Rev. Timothy M. DOLAN
Archbishop of Milwaukee
P.O. Box 070912
Milwaukee, WI 53207-0912
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DISPOSITIVE

CONGREGATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH

This Court of Appeal of the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith upholds the findings of the Court of First Instance of the Archdiocese of Milwaukee in the AFFIRMATIVE as to the proven guilt of Marvin T. Knighton as a cleric of the allegations of the sexual abuse of a minor by a cleric presented by Mr.

This Court also uphold the finding of that same Court of First Instance in the NEGATIVE as to the guilt of Marvin T. Knighton of the allegation of the sexual abuse by a cleric of a minor presented by Mr.


As a penalty for his violations of the obligations of the clerical state, this Court furthermore dismisses Marvin T. Knighton from the clerical state. He is permanently removed from the exercise of any ecclesiastical ministry except as provided in the Code of Canon Law and any faculties or privileges or compensation that would accompany the clerical state from the date of the execution of this decision unless it be part of the severance agreement reached by the Archdiocese of Milwaukee in view of justice due to his past service to the people of God.


This decision is to be published to Mr. Michael Ritty as Advocate "for his eyes only". It is to be published to the Archbishop of Milwaukee for the purposes of a review by Marvin T. Knighton without his receiving a copy. All are to be reminded of the Pontifical Secret in these matters.

As a decision of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith acting on behalf of the Supreme Pontiff, this Decision is not subject to appeal.

RE: Rev. Martin T. Knighton
CDF Num. Prot.

Signed, decreed, witnessed, and published on this 13th day of January 2011 at the Tribunal Office of the Archdiocese of Cincinnati, Ohio, U.S.A.





BE IT KNOWN TO ALL

that this case is explicitly subject to the Pontifical Secret (art 25. Gravior Delicta. Normae Processualis); this applies to all information, processes and decisions associated with this case (Secreta continere, February 4, 1974 [.AAS, 66 1974, pages 89-92]).